Market Microstructure
Level 4 (Application: novel problem-solving, no hints) Time limit: 60 minutes Total marks: 60
Answer all questions. Show all reasoning. Use notation for calculations where useful.
Question 1 — Order Book Dynamics & Price Impact (14 marks)
A stock's limit order book at time is:
| Bid Size | Bid Price | Ask Price | Ask Size | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 500 | 100.00 | 100.05 | 300 | |
| 800 | 99.95 | 100.10 | 600 | |
| 1200 | 99.90 | 100.15 | 900 | |
| 1000 | 99.85 | 100.20 | 400 |
(a) State the current mid-price and quoted bid-ask spread. (2)
(b) A trader submits a marketable buy order for 1,500 shares. Compute the volume-weighted average execution price (VWAP), and hence the total price impact in cents relative to the mid-price. (5)
(c) After the order fully executes and no replenishment occurs, state the new best ask, new mid-price, and new quoted spread. (3)
(d) Explain, using this book, why a symmetric 1,500-share sell order would incur a different price impact, and state whether the book above is bid-heavy or ask-heavy in the top three levels (justify numerically). (4)
Question 2 — Bid-Ask Spread Decomposition & Adverse Selection (12 marks)
A dealer quotes a spread on a security. Empirically, the effective half-spread of cents decomposes into three components: order-processing, inventory-holding, and adverse-selection.
(a) You observe: after a buy trade the mid-price rises on average by cents within one minute; after a sell trade it falls by cents. Explain why this quantity estimates the adverse-selection component, and state its value. (4)
(b) The order-processing component is measured at cent. Compute the residual inventory-holding component. (2)
(c) The dealer now trades a stock with more informed traders in the flow. Predict qualitatively how each of the three components changes, and the net effect on the quoted spread. (4)
(d) Explain why a purely competitive market maker, facing adverse selection, cannot profitably quote a spread narrower than twice the adverse-selection component. (2)
Question 3 — Tick Size, Lot Size & Iceberg Orders (12 marks)
A regulator reduces the tick size on a stock from to .
(a) The stock previously traded at a bid / ask . Give the minimum spread now achievable and describe two likely changes to displayed depth at the best quotes. (4)
(b) A trader wants to buy 10,000 shares but displays only 500 at a time using an iceberg order with peak size 500. If each replenished slice takes an average of 3 seconds to be consumed, and refill latency is negligible, estimate the minimum time to fully execute purely from displayed slices, and state one detection risk. (4)
(c) The lot size is 100 shares. A trader enters an order for 1,050 shares. Explain what happens to the odd 50 shares under a strict round-lot regime, and give one reason exchanges introduce odd-lot handling. (2)
(d) Explain how a smaller tick size interacts with queue priority to disadvantage large passive liquidity providers. (2)
Question 4 — Call Auction Mechanism (12 marks)
A pre-open call auction collects the following orders:
Buy orders (cumulative demand):
| Price | Cumulative Buy Qty |
|---|---|
| 101 | 200 |
| 100 | 500 |
| 99 | 900 |
| 98 | 1300 |
Sell orders (cumulative supply):
| Price | Cumulative Sell Qty |
|---|---|
| 98 | 300 |
| 99 | 700 |
| 100 | 1000 |
| 101 | 1400 |
(Cumulative buy = buyers willing to pay ≥ that price; cumulative sell = sellers willing to accept ≤ that price.)
(a) Determine the auction clearing price that maximises matched volume. Show the matched volume at each candidate price. (6)
(b) State the matched (executed) volume at the clearing price and the resulting order imbalance at that price. (3)
(c) Explain one advantage of a call auction over continuous trading at market open in terms of price discovery and adverse selection. (3)
Question 5 — Latency, Co-location & Dark Pools (10 marks)
(a) Two firms trade the same signal. Firm A has a round-trip latency of ; Firm B co-locates and achieves . A fleeting arbitrage opportunity persists for . State which firm(s) capture it and justify. (3)
(b) A large institution must sell 1,000,000 shares. Explain, with reference to price impact and information leakage, why routing through a dark pool may be preferable to the lit book, and state one disadvantage. (4)
(c) Explain how the presence of latency-advantaged traders contributes to the adverse-selection component of the spread faced by slower liquidity providers. (3)
Answer keyMark scheme & solutions
Question 1 (14)
(a) Mid = . Spread = cents. (2) — mid is midpoint of best bid/ask; spread is best ask − best bid.
(b) Buy 1,500 walks the ask side:
- 300 @ 100.05 = 30,015
- 600 @ 100.10 = 60,060
- remaining 600 @ 100.15 = 60,090
Total cost = for 1,500 shares. VWAP . (3) Price impact vs mid = cents. (2)
(c) 900-share level at 100.15 partially consumed (600 of 900 taken), leaving 300 @ 100.15. New best ask = . Best bid unchanged . New mid . New spread cents. (3) — award marks for ask, mid, spread.
(d) A 1,500 sell walks the bid side: 500@100.00, 800@99.95, 200@99.90 → VWAP , impact cents. Different from buy impact (8.5c) because depth is asymmetric. (2) Top-3 bid depth ; top-3 ask depth . Bid-heavy (more resting buy volume), so sells absorb into deeper liquidity → smaller impact. (2)
Question 2 (12)
(a) Post-trade mid reversion/continuation measures the permanent (information) price move a trade causes: informed buys push the "true" value up. The average one-minute post-trade mid move of cents in the trade direction = permanent impact = adverse-selection half-component = 2.4 cents. (4) — must link permanent price move to information content.
(b) Half-spread = order-processing + inventory + adverse-selection. cents. (2)
(c) More informed flow → adverse-selection ↑ (bigger permanent moves); order-processing ≈ unchanged (technology/cost driven); inventory ↑ slightly (harder to offload against informed flow / more risk). Net: quoted spread widens. (4) — 1 mark each component + net.
(d) If the MM quotes a spread below adverse-selection, then on average the permanent price move against them exceeds the round-trip spread earned; informed traders systematically pick them off, giving negative expected profit. Competition drives spread down only to the point where processing + inventory profit covers adverse-selection loss; the floor is set by adverse selection. (2)
Question 3 (12)
(a) Minimum spread now (one tick), down from . Likely changes: (i) narrower quoted spreads / more price levels populated; (ii) reduced displayed depth at each price level (liquidity fragmented across many ticks), and more frequent quote flickering / smaller size at best. (4) — 2 for min spread, 2 for any two depth effects.
(b) 10,000 / 500 = 20 slices; each slice ~3 s to be consumed → s ≈ 60 seconds minimum. Detection risk: repeated identical 500-share refills at the same price level reveal a hidden iceberg (pattern/refill signature), allowing others to front-run. (4) — 2 for 60 s, 2 for detection.
(c) Under strict round-lot regime the odd 50 shares fall below the 100-share lot and cannot be routed as a standard lot; the order may be rejected/truncated to 1,000 (nearest round lot) or routed to a separate odd-lot facility. Exchanges provide odd-lot handling to serve retail/fractional interest and improve accessibility & liquidity for small trades. (2)
(d) With a smaller tick, price-improvement costs only 1 cent, so a competitor can jump the queue by posting one tick better very cheaply, eroding the value of time priority earned by a large resting order. Large passive providers lose queue position frequently, reducing their fill probability. (2)
Question 4 (12)
(a) Matched volume at price = .
- : buy(≥98)=1300, sell(≤98)=300 → matched
- : buy(≥99)=900, sell(≤99)=700 → matched
- : buy(≥100)=500, sell(≤100)=1000 → matched
- : buy(≥101)=200, sell(≤101)=1400 → matched
Max matched volume = 700 at . (6) — 1 per correct line, 2 for identifying max.
(b) Matched volume = 700. At : demand 900, supply 700 → imbalance = shares excess buy demand (unfilled buy). (3)
(c) A call auction aggregates all orders to a single clearing price, giving a robust price-discovery point from consolidated liquidity and reducing the ability of a single fast/informed trader to pick off stale quotes (batching removes continuous-time speed advantage), lowering adverse selection at the open. (3)
Question 5 (10)
(a) Opportunity lasts . Firm B (40 μs < 150) captures it; Firm A (250 μs > 150) arrives after it disappears and captures nothing. (3)
(b) Dark pool: orders are hidden (no pre-trade display), so a 1,000,000-share sell does not signal intent to the lit market → less information leakage and less price impact / walking the book. Disadvantage: uncertain/low fill probability (execution not guaranteed) and possible interaction with predatory flow / lack of pre-trade transparency. (4) — 2 for impact+leakage, 2 for disadvantage.
(c) Latency-advantaged traders can update/cancel and pick off a slow provider's stale quote right after news, so the slow provider disproportionately trades when the price is about to move against them — this is exactly adverse selection, widening the spread they must quote to survive. (3)
[
{"claim":"Q1b VWAP of 1500-share buy is 100.11","code":"cost=300*100.05+600*100.10+600*100.15; vwap=cost/1500; result = abs(vwap-100.11)<1e-9"},
{"claim":"Q1b price impact is 8.5 cents","code":"cost=300*100.05+600*100.10+600*100.15; vwap=cost/1500; mid=100.025; result = abs((vwap-mid)-0.085)<1e-9"},
{"claim":"Q1d sell VWAP is 99.96","code":"cost=500*100.00+800*99.95+200*99.90; vwap=cost/1500; result = abs(vwap-99.96)<1e-9"},
{"claim":"Q2b inventory component is 0.6 cents","code":"inv=4.0-1.0-2.4; result = abs(inv-0.6)<1e-9"},
{"claim":"Q4 max matched volume is 700 at price 99","code":"buy={98:1300,99:900,100:500,101:200}; sell={98:300,99:700,100:1000,101:1400}; m={p:min(buy[p],sell[p]) for p in buy}; best=max(m,key=lambda p:m[p]); result = (best==99 and m[99]==700)"}
]